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## HUMAN NATURE AND CULTURE IN THE LIGHT OF PHILOSOPHY

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### Abstract

*As a result of his experiences during the First World War, as well as his time spent as a gardener, teacher, and architect, Wittgenstein encountered the reality of existence through the complexities of identity, will, and ethics. This led him to move beyond traditional philosophy in search of anthropological grounding. In his reflections on thought, language, the self, and consciousness—particularly in his efforts to understand mental states and language games, which he revisited from a phenomenological perspective—he explored the connection between intention ("wanting to do") and expression ("what you want to say"). Through these investigations, Wittgenstein emphasized that understanding language depends on the meanings and signs involved, as well as their use in language games. He also highlighted specific aspects that shape language use, including how individuals behave and interact with one another within these games.*

**Keywords:** Thought, Language, Language Games, Consciousness, Meaning.

### 1. Introduction

In the preface to the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein stated that he was convinced he had, in essence, solved the entire problem of philosophy. This solution involved not only his treatment of logic and language but, more fundamentally—as discussed in our first chapter—the problem of life itself. The emphasis on language in this work is not a mere substitution for other philosophical concerns; rather, it serves as a means to attain a coherent understanding of reality, and within it, of human life.

A possible anthropological conception detached from the *Tractatus*, as we intend to show, is configured on the horizon of a metaphysical subject who, in his identity, traces the contours of the will and, by extension of ethics, arriving at contributions about God, death and happiness. The *Tractatus* is, therefore, a unique reflective exercise on man, which has no precedent in the history of Western philosophy. Meticulously constructed, with almost

obsessive zeal, it presents, on the horizon, the mystical man: perhaps the man who has experienced Pascal's cosmic solitude.

The proposition of this anthropological particularity was not born in aseptic academic environments, it was not the result of isolated reflections immune to the imperatives of life. Before, it was created in a hostile environment in which the meanings of life constantly and insistently touched, the dramatic experience of the limit. First directly – the first world war in which Wittgenstein takes part and, later, indirectly in contact with a kind of reality of decadence illustrated by *fin-de-siècle* Vienna. Wittgenstein's life is: “a life marked by a series of transformations consummated in moments of crisis and undertaken with the conviction that the source of the crisis was himself, [4].

Profoundly changed by the experience of war, Wittgenstein returned to his native Vienna in 1919 to, dispensing with philosophy, continue his life in a heterogeneous existential experience that involved work as a gardener in a convent, an elementary school teacher in the interior of Austria and the architect of the house. from his sister Gretl. This separation seemed to be a time to put into practice the ethical imperative set out in the *Tractatus* according to records 6.43, 6.4321 and 6.521. A few years later, in 1929, he returned to Cambridge, ready to resume his philosophical work, motivated both by obtaining the title of Doctor in Philosophy and by a series of scholarships obtained from Trinity College.

The decade that becomes what we called at the beginning of the first chapter a “fertile retreat” (1919 -1929), is configured as a space that allows Wittgenstein, with regard to life experience, to move from the conception centered on the mystical man to that in the ceremonial man. While at the time of the gestation of the *Tractatus* the plot was woven around the solipsism that established the presence of “my world” and “my language”, now, the meanings of a common belonging to the world are cultivated that will end up postulating the presence of “our world” and “our language. What is revealed is, on the one hand, the limits of the world highlighted by war and, on the other, the most absolute routine of the days carried out in the tasks of everyday life.

It is possible to state that the changes can be characterized like this: in the environment of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein intends to solve problems. Now you are becoming aware that problems should not be solved, but dissolved. There he sought the essence of the proposition, now he is convinced that this essence does not exist. In the environment of the *Tractatus*, the philosopher believed that if a proposition had meaning it should be perfectly determining, now knows that this is an illusion.

The fact that Wittgenstein withdrew from philosophy did not cause him and his work to be withdrawn from the philosophical environment. It is precisely in this period that the author and work are taken as disturbing novelties in the context of academic philosophy. In this respect it is necessary to indicate the interest aroused by both among the authors of the so-called Vienna Circle, in particular first by Frank Ramsey in Cambridge and then by Moritz Schlick in Vienna. Schlick, for example, dedicated himself to organizing meetings where Carnap, Feigl, Waismann were added to him in order to obtain from the author of the *Tractatus* clarifications about his thought.

Wittgenstein's presence in the Vienna Circle became decisive. Ramsey, for his part, quickly ceased to be only the English translator of the work to be a genuine interlocutor of the

philosopher and, with his questions, forced the author of the *Tractatus* to rethink fundamental questions of the text that he thought he had definitively solved.

The debate with Ramsey was fruitful. Wittgenstein, at first, was convinced that he could incorporate within the very structure of the *Tractatus* the observations reflected from the provocations raised. In 1930 he had prepared a *TypeScript*, published posthumously as a result of that conviction. However, he realized that the initiative would be fruitless as more and more questions were directed at him.

In the period between 1929 and 1936 the initiative was transposed into a completely new project. The philosopher renounced the project of reaffirming the conditions of possibility and meaning of language as a basis for understanding life, and replaced it with an anthropological reflection that, under the same themes, sought to understand the functioning of language, probing the conditions of its use by the subjects inserted in a linguistic community. This project was realized in *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, in Portuguese, *Investigações Filosóficas*.

## 2. Philosophical Investigations: The Architecture of the Collective Use of Language

The composition and publication of the text follow a trajectory that is established in what has been identified as Wittgenstein's anthropological time, establishing an unusual style of its author. The Hermeticism of the *Tractatus* falls apart completely. Now nothing is recorded that is not the absolutely ordinary. The author himself, in the manuscripts records: “if my book is written as it should be, everything I say should be easy to understand, it should even be trivial; it will only be difficult to understand why I say it.” What investigations presents us with are “ annotations” in an ordinary style devoid of a connection with each other; more like the work of an artist than with the work of a philosopher; their understanding must turn to the philosophical intent of the author, that is, the ordinary behavior of language.

The change does not reach the surface, or just the writing style of the works is, rather, the structural change in the way of understanding reality. From the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations*, we can see the path that takes us from the solipsistic man to the community man. In the Preface to *Investigations*, its author records:

But, four years ago, I had the opportunity to read my first book again (the ‘Logical-Philosophical Treatise’) and clarify my thoughts. It seemed to me, suddenly, that I should publish those old thoughts together with the new ones: these could receive their correct illumination only by confronting my older thoughts with them as a background. Since I began, sixteen years ago, to deal with philosophy again, I had to recognize serious errors in what I had exposed in that first book. Frank Ramsey's criticism of my ideas, with whom I discussed them in countless conversations during the last two years of his life, helped me to recognize these errors - even I cannot judge to what extent. Even more than this criticism – always vigorous and sure, - I am grateful for the criticism that a professor at this University, Mr. P. Sraffa, continually made to my thoughts, for many years. I owe

the most fruitful ideas in this writing to this stimulus, [12].

This explanation reveals what Malcom believes to be contained in the Investigations, that is, that the text contains “an explicit or implicit attack on the previous work”. Wittgenstein, from within Investigations, is convinced that reality, and therefore human life, is not based either on the figurative basis of the proposition or on the basis of the principle of verification, but rather on its meaning as use.

Philosophical Investigations is presented in two parts starring a kind of imaginary dialogue, recorded in paragraphs, between two possible personalities of the author; one from the theorist wanting to embrace philosophical convictions and, another, denouncing how misleading they are. A presentation is necessary so that, from its content, we can gather the elements that matter to the necessary conception of the life of the ceremonial man that emerges from the work. Below we present an indication of the most significant elements.

The first part extends from paragraph 1 to 693. A thematic distribution can be established as follows: paragraphs 1 to 137 record the review of the positions that the philosopher had taken in the Tractatus. This segment includes criticism of the denotation and representation of meanings. There is also a refusal to accept that philosophy is an activity that deals with the essence of anything. The author now defends the idea that philosophy should only describe language as it appears in our daily lives. Questions regarding the relationship between meaning and understanding mark paragraphs between 137 and 184.

The central nucleus of the work is located between segments 185 and 242. In them, the conception of rules and their follow-up are of vital importance, which is expressed contrary to that of meaning that had dominated the Tractatus. Following a rule allows a distance from mentalism and leads to an accentuation of the anthropological aspects contained in its dynamics. Wittgenstein is dedicated to exposing the impossibility of a private language. The relationship between thought and language is described in segments 316 and 369.

The themes of self and consciousness occupy the space between 404 and 427. The problems of intentional states and their relationship with the grammar of language can be found in the range between 428 and 465. Realities such as reasons, motives and justification appear in space 466 and 490. Thus, the relationship between meaning, mental states and understanding are resumed, illuminated by a phenomenology of such processes and experiences in segment 491 and 570.

Finally, a consideration of the grammar of expressions appears in the segment that goes from 571 to the end and, in it, aspects relating to expectation, belief and hope are highlighted, emphasized by the question of intention both, with regard to the fact that wanting to do and wanting to say something. In this segment, the anti-mentalist approach that characterizes this entire first part of Investigations stands out.

The second part, shorter than the first, consists of 14 sections of unequal size. The most famous of these is the section of number XI in which the use of the word “see” (see aspects) is treated. The theme of experience is developed in sections II and VI. the considerations that deal with the attribution of psychological states to others are indicated in sections I, IV and V and supported in IX

and X. Section III explores the theme of intentionality. Sections XII and XIV in turn describe a methodological interest in which Wittgenstein makes it clear that his interest has no affinities with scientific pretensions.

More synthetically. Philosophical Investigations may thus be presented. Part one, paragraphs (§§) 1 – 80; 89 – 137: criticism of the Tractatus, family similarity and status of philosophy; §§ 81 – 88, 138 – 242, 491 – 569: understand, mean and follow rule; §§ 428 – 465, 466 – 490; intentions and their content, reasons; § § 571 – 693: intentional States and intentionality; § § 243-427: private language, thought and language, the self and consciousness. Second part, Section I, mental states in general: IV, V-in relation to behavior and IX - mental states in relation to their expression. Particular mental states are treated in VII dreaming; VIII kinesthetic sensations; X belief and Moore's paradox; XIII remembering. II, VI, XI experiential experiences of meaning; XI-see-how, III-intentionality, XIV a-psychology and XII-grammar and nature.

The work thus structured can be summarized in three fundamental theses.

- The meaning of words and propositions is their use in language.
- Uses are configured in language games.
- Language games do not share a common essence; they retain a family resemblance.

Just as the Tractatus presents itself as an innovation in the scenario of Western philosophy, investigations also projects itself against the concerns that guided philosophy, especially at the beginning of the twentieth century. it bears no similarities with tradition and much less with constructions that evoke positivism, idealism, phenomenology or analytic philosophy constant at the time of the philosopher. In the same way that the Tractatus demanded a new look at reality and, in it, at Man, investigations also recreates the scenarios of the event of reality and man. For this to be evident, we resume the above theses with the aim of exposing the condition of these events.

### 3. The Primacy of use

The Tractatus had not refrained from giving meaning to the notion of use . In that work, however, Wittgenstein works with a particularity that only makes sense if it is associated with the question of thought. It could be said that, in it, the use is what gives meaning to the proposition, that is, that it is significant when it is thought: when the subject thinks the world. In the Tractatus the understanding of language depends on the awareness of the meaning of the simple signs and manifests itself in their application. In the Investigations environment, in turn, Wittgenstein will identify the meaning with the use as recorded in § 43.

The idea that meaning manifests itself in use, that explaining the meaning of an expression corresponds to describing its use, or, that – ultimately – the meaning is the use itself, is in connection with the defense it makes of the fact that all that is essential to understanding, is, it is all installed in the very practice of language and this is discussed in the case of following a rule. It is quite timely § 432 where it reads: “Every sign, alone, looks dead. What gives it life? – It is alive in use. Does he have in him the breath of life? – Or is the use of his breath?”

In the environment of the Investigations, and giving support to the notion of use, the philosopher goes abandoning the figurative theory of the proposition and the use is established as a criterion for the meaning: asking for the meaning of a word or phrase is the same as asking how it is used, and the mode of use is what decides whether or not someone has understood its meaning. In this context, the variety of uses of language appears expanded to the maximum: we are faced with multiple classes of statements and countless possible uses as we can read in Investigations § 23 [4]:

But how many kinds of phrases are there? Perhaps assertion, question and order? – There are numerous such species: numerous different species of employment of what we call “signos”, “words”, “phrases”. And this variety is not something fixed, given once and for all; but, we may say, new kinds of language, new language games arise, others grow old and are forgotten. (The mutations of mathematics can give us an approximate picture of this.)

It is not possible to affirm that the criterion of meaning as use presupposes the complete abandonment of the figurative theory of the proposition that had occupied, in an essential way, the center of the reflections developed in the environment of the Tractatus; even if its substantial modification is verified, the author of Investigations seems to reduce it to one more of the uses.

The affirmation of the criterion of use as meaning also directly strikes at another of the certainties of that first work; that is, the nominative theory that circumscribed the referentiality of language. In this regard, it is salutary to recall that Wittgenstein begins his Investigations with the famous passage from the Confessions of St. Augustine.

When they (my parents) said the name of an object and then moved towards it, I would observe them and understand that the object was designated by the sound they made when they wanted to show it ostentatiously. Their intention was revealed by the movements of the body, as if these were the natural language of all peoples: the facial expression, the gaze, the movements of the other parts of the body and the tone of voice, which expresses the state of mind when wishing, having, rejecting or avoiding something. Thus, by hearing words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I came to understand what objects these words designated. And once I had accustomed my mouth to articulating these sounds, I used them to express my own desires [5].

The author's intent lies in the fact that both the bishop of Hippo, who in turn already had the knowledge of Plato's Cratylus, and in his Tractatus, had spread to a practice that presupposed unique models translated into the ideal of referentiality. In the affirmation of meaning as use, central to Investigations, this practice is dismantled and, in order to confront Augustine's text, the exemplification that is present in § 2 is presented, where we see the record of the example of an ordinary language between two workers. In § 3 we read Wittgenstein's critique:

Not everything we call language is a system. And this needs to be said in certain cases where the question arises, 'Is this exposition useful or useless?' The answer: it's useful; but only for that strictly circumscribed domain, not for the totality you need to expose.' It's as if

someone were to explain: 'Playing consists of moving things on a surface according to certain rules...' – and we answer: you seem to be thinking of board games, but not all games are like these. You can rectify your explanation by expressly limiting it to these games [5].

The assertion of the variety of uses dismantles the arguments of referentiality that supported solipsism and that, basically, were made effective in the postulates that determined that all significant elements of language were or could be reduced to logically proper names corresponding to objects and that the meaning of a term agreed with the object it named.

The expressiveness of the usage claims the fact that names constitute only a part of the significant terms of language: there are in language a large number of words which name nothing, and which nevertheless possess meaning. Wittgenstein cites the word "perhaps" as an example to show that its meaning is restricted to the use we make of it in language and that it is the application of the term in particular circumstances and in a particular way that indicates the understanding of its meaning. Talking about objects, developing the function of naming, is not the only thing in language. In Investigations § 27, the expressions "Out!", "Alas!" appear, about which the author questions whether they should be indicated as names of objects.

The most famous of the examples, of the expressiveness of the use against the nominative referentiality, can be found in § 1 when the terms "five", "apple" and "red" are used. The passage is illustrative in itself in revealing the dynamics of composition for the learning of meaning in the space of use.

Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a sheet of paper with the signs: "five red apples". He takes the paper to the merchant. He opens the drawer on which the sign "apple" stands. He looks up the word "red" in a table and finds a color sample in front of it. He says the sequence of numerals—I suppose he knows it by heart—down to the word "five," and at each number he takes out of the drawer an apple that has the color of the sample—In the same way we operate with words [12].

The understanding of the meaning of "apple", "five" and "red" is revealed in the location of the object and corresponding color. The way in which the merchant masters the terms is shown exclusively in his behavior, that is, the use made by him. What is to be gathered from this is expressed in § 43: "For a large class of cases, though not all—of the use of the word 'meaning', this word may be explained in the following way: the meaning of a word is its use in language [1].

Wittgenstein compares words to tools, according to §11. Words have the same type of behavior: they are defined by their use, which can be extremely varied. Words are not mere labels that apply to objects, but instruments that fulfill the most varied types of functions. Its uniformity is only an appearance; language is, says Wittgenstein, like the cab of a locomotive in which are distributed a series of apparently identical commands, each of which, however, is intended for different purposes [2].

The fact that all words are names is only one part of the argument, and the other corresponds to the fact that even names cannot be said to have their meaning as their reference. In some cases, it is possible to explain the meaning of a name by indicating the object

that constitutes its reference, but this does not imply that meaning and reference coincide, as recorded in § 27 of Philosophical Grammar "the meaning of a name is not the thing we point out when we offer an ostensible definition of the name. The name does not lose its meaning if its bearer ceases to exist (if he dies, say) [4]."

The abandonment of the reductionisms contained in the Tractatus and the acquisition of pluralism of uses, an expression of the Investigations, shows us something more significant in the field of considerations that affect the way of being of man in his reality, in his context. The use would be inconceivable in the space of solipsism: it requires the ceremony that places man in front of another in a specific space. It is the context that determines the efficiency of use, and this is evident in the soil of language games [3].

#### 4. Language Games

The approximation between language and games in the Investigations environment is of unique importance. Words, like tools, are defined as seen by their use, and this practice does not come from something isolated, but imposes itself in the space of a context of activities of both linguistic and non-linguistic nature. This exercise is not unique and encompasses a multitude of functions [6].

In view of this, we can ask ourselves: what is the criterion for distinguishing the multiplicity of linguistic uses? Or, more specifically: how do we identify the usages and rules that correspond to a word in each particular case, and how are we sure that a word is being used in this way and not another? What makes this possible for us are different contexts that enable practice. This constitutes what Wittgenstein calls "language games" [13].

The comparison between language and games is complex in Investigations. Unlike other analogies explored by the philosopher, that of language game is defined as a neologism that becomes a technical term that lacks a definition and that works in a similar way to the open concepts of ordinary language, such as that of family resemblances, but which does not have common traits that are repeated in all cases. In §§ 654 and 655 we read:

Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we should see the facts as 'original phenomena'. That is where we should say: this language game is played. – It is not an explanation of a language game through our experiences, but the observation of a language game [7].

The phrase "language game" emerges from one of Wittgenstein's favorite comparisons: that of language and games. It appears for the first time in Philosophical Grammar with the aim of investigating the analogies between the two, and is definitively established in the later writings that set the Investigations. In the Blue Notebook, the philosopher tries to present more broadly the situation where the form of the language game is shown [8]:

And here you have a case of using words. In the future I will call attention once and again to what I call language games. They are ways of using signs, simpler than the ways we use signs in our highly complicated ordinary language. Language games are the forms of language with which a child begins to use words. The study of language games is the study of primitive language forms or primitive languages. If we ask ourselves to study the problems of truth and falsehood, of understanding and

accuracy of propositions with reality, of the naturalness of assertion, supposition and questioning, it will be very interesting to consider primitive forms of language in that These forms of thinking appear without disturbing the highly complicated thought processes. When we consider such simple forms of language, the mental darkness that seems to involve our ordinary use of language disappears.

In this presentation, Wittgenstein urges us to consider that the notion of a language game does not stand on its own; There is a texture to it that needs to be taken into account. The game carries with it some features.

Simplicity is the first of them. In indicating that the game expresses "the way in which a child begins to use words", we identify the particularity of how simplified the use of words is, within the scope of the game. The game, due to its simplicity, connects us with what is most primitive in the exercise of language. The primitive of language seems, in the Wittgensteinian context, to be both that which is included in the space of a "primitive language", indicating a first language, and also that which makes us look at the "language of primitives" [10].

With the indication of "language of the primitives, the author of the Investigations does not want to imply that primitive communities are possessors of poor and childish languages. Furthermore, what we want to show is the fact that, in its simplicity, the game carries with it the sense of effectiveness, that is, that in it we do not remain entangled by the threads of a complex instance that would need to be deciphered as an enigma. In this regard we found recorded in the *Caderno Marron*:

However, we are not contemplating the language games that we describe as incomplete parts of a language, but as complete languages in the same way, as complete systems of human communication. To avoid forgetting this point of view, it is often convenient to imagine that these very simple languages are the internal communication system of a tribe in a primitive state of society. Learn about the primitive arithmetic of these tribes [9].

A second implicit characteristic of the language game is found in its expression of activity. The situation of a game carries with it the marks that are expressed by the implications of acting and reacting. There is a close connection between speaking a language and carrying out an activity as we can read in Investigations § 23 "the expression 'language game' should highlight here that speaking a language is part of an activity or a way of life" [11].

The most significant thing about this property is that the game, as a simple activity in the complex human language, makes it possible to demonstrate that meanings are not linked, in principle, to sophisticated mental processes of understanding or knowledge, but to use in the context of the activity. This identity of the game as an activity shows that acting and reacting can be present in cultural issues as well as in those natural to speakers. As an example of the dynamics of the game in culture, the recitation of poetry, a dance, a song and the solution of mathematical problems can be highlighted. Regarding the natural, we locate the "primitive", pre-linguistic actions and reactions that constitute human nature itself, as read in *Zettel* 540, 541 and 545:

It helps here to remember what a primitive reaction it is to care, to treat the organ that hurts, when another person is in pain; and not just when we are – and in this way pay attention to other people's pain behavior, in a way that we don't when it comes to our own pain behavior.... But what does the word 'primitive' mean here? Probably that this type of behavior is pre-linguistic: that a language game is based on it, that it is the prototype of a way of thinking, and not the result of thought... our language game is an extension of primitive behavior [13].

A third characteristic of the language game comes from the force of the rule. In *Philosophical Grammar* 26 Wittgenstein points out: “But we look at games and language under the guise of a game played according to rules. That is, we are always comparing language with a procedure of this type”: the activity in the game is definitely limited to following the rule, that is, it is always an activity governed by rules. Paying attention to this fact makes us see that a system of rules, however, is not given all at once and does not rigidly define what belongs and what does not belong to the activity. Every use of language demands a system of rules or grammar and this is similar to a game [12].

Indeterminacy is a fourth note of the language game. Wittgenstein, on several occasions, such as *Investigations* § 71, 76-77, 83, had the opportunity to show that the contours of a game are never clearly defined. Although games individualize an activity, nothing is established with absolute clarity and that is why we can read in *Philosophical Grammar*:

Yes, but there are many things we call games and many we don't, many things we call rules and many we don't!– But it's never a question of drawing a line between everything we call games and everything else. For us, games are the games we hear about, the games we can list, and perhaps some others, newly elaborated by analogy; and if someone wrote a book about games, they wouldn't actually need to use the word “game” in the book's title ;could use as a title a list of the names of individual games [14].

Added to these, we glimpse a fifth particularity of games, their plurality. The notes listed require, in the context of the *Investigations*, that attention be paid to what their author warns in § 23 and 24:

And this variety is not something fixed, given once and for all; but, we can say, new types of language, new language games emerge, others grow old and are forgotten... think about the number of things called “description” describing a situation of a body through its coordinates; description of a facial expression; description of a tactile sensation, an arrangement [12].

In view of this, we must be clear that the analysis of the functioning of our language must be carried out as a consideration of particular cases of the use of words in the different games where they occur. Finally, we find ourselves faced with a sixth constituent note of games, which is the presence of terms of comparison. This particularity assumes a methodological function because language games not only particularize an object, but also indicate the means through which the action is carried out. Wittgenstein is concerned that these games do not constitute, as recorded in *Investigations* § 130:

Our clear and simple language games are not preparatory studies for a future regulation of language, - they are not, so to speak, preliminary approximations, without taking into account friction and air resistance. Language games are there much more as objects of comparison, which, due to similarity and dissimilarity, should shed light on the relationships of our language[13].

These six notes make it clear that the language game, due to the variety of its uses, is used by the philosopher in at least two senses. In one of them we are faced with the need that challenges us to face the issue of the language-world relationship and, in the other, to account for the way in which, through which, reflection on the logical or grammatical relationship of language is correctly conducted.

The best illustration of the language game as an event can be found in the famous example given in *Investigations* § 18 where we read: “We can see our language as an old city: a network of alleys and squares, old and new houses, and patchwork houses. from different times; and this is all surrounded by a large number of new neighborhoods, with straight and regular streets and uniform houses”.

## 5. Grammar and Forms of Life

The considerations made so far put us before a certainty that runs through all the Wittgensteinian literature of the surroundings of *Investigations* and that turn to the language game as its central device. Games are defined by a system of rules aimed at governing each of them individually. The rules, in turn, differ from the cases in which the games are applied. These same characteristics can be located in the language itself. A word also acquires different uses, that is, it is regulated by different norms in the context of the game in which it is used. And just as a soccer ball cannot be used in the game of table tennis, so words cannot be used in all language games.

In this way, at the same pace as the game, language is also a regulated activity. Wittgenstein has made it clear that the meaning of words is found in their use, in the function they fulfill in language; we are faced with the fact that all this implies a series of norms or guidelines, what is identified as the rules of use. Such rules vary in each case according to the function that approximates the word, or according to the language game to which they belong. Each game comprises a series of rules by which the words included in it must be governed in order to perform their function.

Wittgenstein attests that the rule of language is contained in grammar. Grammar would be the description of the language that provides the rules for the combination of symbols, indicating which one has meaning, which is allowed and which do not meet the criteria. For the philosopher the concept of grammar does not have affinities with the usual conception of the term. In the Wittgensteinian context, grammar makes no reference to the material aspects of linguistic signs or to the formal laws of their combination; it is oriented to the semantic aspects of language, as well as its content and the laws governing the use of signs [8].

Having the conviction that the use of a term is inserted in a context of both linguistic and extralinguistic activities, its rules of use – its grammar – should not be limited purely to linguistic aspects, but should take into account the set of situations and behaviors where it is used. In this way, as Bouveresse points out, grammar acquires a greater meaning than that of a system of formal regulation of

language: it is an apparatus that governs all the interdependent aspects of the same social behavior. Grammar, while regulating the use of language, has the property of describing its functioning [2].

Wittgenstein is convinced that the rules of using words do not immediately reveal themselves in them. It is for this reason that it indicates the existence of both a superficial grammar and that deep grammar. Superficial grammar is the instance of immediate adherence to the use of a word, it explains the way the meaning is captured, as soon as the word sensitizes the ear. Behind this immediate appearance, and concealed by it, lies the meaning, the real application of the word, which constitutes profound grammar. Two passages of research are illuminating. The first is found in § 664 :

In the use of a word, a distinction could be made between a "superficial grammar" and a "deep grammar". In the use of a word, what is fixed upon us immediately is the mode of its application in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use-one might say-that one can learn by ear. - And now compare the deep grammar, e.g., of the word "keep-in-mind," with what its shallow grammar would have us suppose. No wonder it's hard to be on the inside [12].

The second explanation is found in § 422:

What do I believe, when I believe in a soul in man? What do I believe when this substance contains two rings of carbon atoms? In both cases, there is an image in the foreground, but the sense is in the background; that is, it is not easy to have an overview of the application of the image [14].

In grammatical rules the character of necessity is not present since they are configured in conventions. Nothing in nature can compel us to take one particular system in place of another, nothing, too, can justify its choice. Grammar is arbitrary in the sense that its goal is none other than language itself.

In this particularity Wittgenstein establishes a contrast between the rules of grammar and the rules of cooking: cooking, unlike speaking and judging, is shaped by its purpose. Being guided in the kitchen by rules other than the correct ones implies cooking badly. On the contrary, letting oneself be guided by different rules of a specific game simply means playing another game or talking about something else as explained in philosophical Grammar§ 133:

Why don't we call cooking rules arbitrary and why are we tempted to call grammar rules arbitrary? Because I think of the concept of "cooking "as defined by the end of cooking, and I don't think of the concept of" language " as defined by the end of language. You cook badly if you are guided in cooking by other rules than the right ones; but if you follow other rules than those of chess you are playing another game; and if you follow other grammatical rules than such and such it does not mean that you say something wrong; no, you are talking about something else [13].

The arbitrariness of grammar is effective for reasons of its autonomy, it cannot possess a real justification. The adoption of a language system is independent of natural facts. Any attempt to justify grammar by appealing to nature is fruitless, since justification must be established by the same rules it seeks to justify.

The autonomy of grammar, however, does not suppose a total arbitrariness. Even if it does not derive from experience, it must maintain a certain affinity with it. The language needs a certain constancy of its results as, for example, in the metric systems as elucidated in investigations § 242:

To understanding by language belongs not only a concordance in definitions, but also (strange as this may sound) a concordance in judgments. This seems to abolish logic; but it does not. - It's one thing to describe the measurement method, it's another thing to find and tell the measurement results. But what we call "measuring" is determined also by a certain constancy of the measurement results [14].

If the rules of grammar are arbitrary, the same does not happen with their application: there is freedom for their establishment. However, once established, they need to be accepted by all participants in the language game. The functioning of language, in this context, depends on Agreement and obedience to rules. The freedom to establish rules is limited by the fact that the user of a language is faced with a previously established system and ways of life that need to be accepted by the community of speakers. This singularity introduces us to the character of social activity that marks language: we are before the forms of life.

In its first occurrences the Expression Language game is accompanied by that of "way of life". This was introduced by Wittgenstein in § 23 of Philosophical Investigations and refers to" activity " as its synonym. The author was clear that the language of which philosophy is interested is a "temporal phenomenon" and not a" non-thing situated outside space and time as can be seen in investigations in § 108 " we speak of the spatial phenomenon and the temporal phenomenon of language; not of an A-Spatial and a-temporal nonsense".

The enterprise to analyze this phenomenon implies taking into account not only its formal-logical armor, but, above all, the concrete situation of its use. The connection thought by Wittgenstein between language and the form of life is so fundamental that he assures in investigations § 19 "representing a language is equivalent to representing a form of life".

Language is a form of human behavior, one of many aspects that mark the social life of Man and that, as such, must be understood in connection with a multiplicity of activities of varied types. Through the use of language-as well as through participation in a game – men begin to relate to other men and interact in the social life of a community.

Wittgenstein is convinced that, in the same way that a single aspect experienced by a community is sufficient to indicate its particularity, a determined language can also reflect the most characteristic features of the community that makes use of it. The complexity of language, that is, the linguistic games that compose it express the whole of the life of its speakers. If, for example, there were a language in which it was not possible to elaborate a question or make a supplication, this would reveal that in the community that experiences it, it would be lacking both one and the other; it would therefore be incapable of asking and supplicating, as exemplified in investigations § 19 "it is easy to imagine a language that is constituted only of commands and battle reports. - Or a language consisting only of questions and an expression of affirmation or denial".

The concept of form of life is of particular importance in investigations and in the literature of its surroundings, despite some mismatches between the various occasions in which the philosopher uses the concept when referring both to language in general and to the uniqueness of language games. Even if this is taken into account, something is clearly established, it is the fact that one cannot speak of a form of life without talking about a language game. It is from within this pair that an expression of what may be a possible theory of meaning beyond that which Wittgenstein had defended at the time of the *Tractatus* is gathered.

The form of Life [1], is established under and affirms the pragmatic and social character of language. With it language ceases to be the mirror that in the *Tractatus* reflected reality from the outside to become an integral part of that same reality. Speech is a form of human behavior. Words are actions as recorded in culture and value:

"The origin and primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from here can more complicated forms develop. Language – I would like to say it-is an improvement, 'in the beginning was action'" [10].

Being action, words are rooted in contexts, expressing situations and behaviors and this firms the way of life. Wittgenstein establishes the awareness that in the same intensity in which language connects to the form of life, it is also taken by it, acts on it and converts it into a form of linguistic life making viable the existence of other forms that, without which, could not happen.

Projecting his attention on the notion of form of life, Wittgenstein expands the picture of the relationship between language and the world. The philosopher rejects the idea that language, in this relationship, comprises an already given formal system that only later finds an application in an already given world, through a complex network of conventional projective norms. In the perspective that language takes as rooted in action or in the form of life, in the same instance in which this is also action.

From the comparison elaborated by the philosopher between words and tools, it cannot be inferred that language is an instrument that works in isolation. Language and the activities arising from it do not belong to an individual, but to a community. Language has rules and obeys-it is a custom, a practice, or an institution. As recorded in investigations § 199:

What we call "following a rule " is something that only a man could do only once in his life? – This is, of course, an observation for the grammar of the expression "follow the rule". It is not possible for a single man to have followed a rule once. It is not possible for a single communication to have been made, a single order to have been given or understood a single time, etc. - Following a rule, making a communication, giving an order, playing a game of chess, are habits (uses, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. Understanding a language means mastering a technique [12].

Practicing a common language is equivalent to assuming a series of standards of conduct. Agreement in language supposes, in short, agreement in the forms of life as expressed in investigations § 241:

"So you are saying, therefore, that agreement among men decides what is right and what is wrong?" Right and

wrong is what men say; and men agree in language. This is not a concordance of opinions, but of ways of life [14].

That is why learning a language is equivalent to living in a certain way. The forms of life constitute the given, that which must be accepted. It is they who ultimately shape the justification of language. The only justification we can present for questioning why we speak this way or that way can be none other than: this is the way of life in which we live.

## 6. Family Similarities

In view of the existence of a plurality of language games, a question becomes imperative. Is there a common element between them? If the answer is yes, what would it be? This question and its respective answer are formulated in investigations § 65:

Here we are faced with the big question that lies behind all these considerations. - Is that someone could retort: You make it much easier! You talk about all possible language games, but you have not said, anywhere, what is the essence of the language game, and therefore of language. What is common to all these processes and makes them a language or pieces of the language. You give yourself as a gift, therefore, exactly the part of the investigation that in its time gave you the greatest headaches, namely: the part that concerns the general form of the proposition of language [8].

The positioning that marks Wittgenstein's response is disconcerting. What is found in common in all language games is exactly the same as what is found among all the activities we call games, that is, nothing. The philosopher, with his answer, takes us beyond the essentialism that he had defended on the occasion of the *Tractatus*. In the same way that it is not possible to affirm the existence of an essence of the games, it is also not possible to indicate a common element among the plurality of them.

What similarity would there be, for example, between the card game and the domino game? Neither verifies the author, even if both are identified as games. Their identity as a game does not put us in a position to look for something common in them. To insist on a common essence would imply a violence to reality, imposing on it schemes that it does not carry. This is how Wittgenstein stands in investigations § 66"...don't say, "there must be something that is common to them, otherwise they wouldn't be called 'games'" – but see if there is something that is common to all.... As it was said: Do not think, but look [6].

The relationship between the Games is varied and complex; they resemble each other in the same way that the members of a family resemble each other: some share the color of the eyes, others The Shape of the forehead, still others the color of the hair, etc. One cannot affirm the exclusivity of one in front of the others, but neither can one defend that there is a common trait that establishes between them a coincidence. In investigations §§ 66 and 67 we read:

Because when you look at them, you will not see something that would be common to all, but you will see similarities, kinship, in fact a good amount of them. (...) and the result of this observation is: we see a complicated network of similarities that overlap each other and intersect. Similarities on a large and small scale. I cannot better characterize these similarities than by the words "family similarities"; for thus overlap and intersect the

various similarities that exist between the members of a family: stature, facial features, eye color, gait, temperament, etc., etc. - And I will say: the 'games' form a family [4].

Language and play do not carry a univocal meaning. They designate a group of activities whose similarities are shown in a gradual way. For this reason, they express the indefinable character of language. Wittgenstein, finally, in the course of the anthropological literature of Philosophical Investigations, advances, in summary, a series of characteristics of linguistic games, such as the fact that they can express a social activity, or even be governed by rules. However, he is averse to the claim of an essence for language; he is convinced that the only possible thing is the identification of some very general traits that do not allow giving it a finished definition [2].

The reading of investigations and, of that which occupies its surroundings, reveals that its author is a deeply engaged man. The engagement here bears no resemblance to what is commonly understood, that is, by adherence to this or that cause. The meaning is broader. Wittgenstein is a man who shows himself in a radically permanent engagement where nothing can be said, done or understood except from within a language game, a community or an activity [1].

This reference relates us to the way in which one can, Beyond the philosopher himself, understand the human status. Who, then, is the man who emerges on the scene of these considerations?

The answer may seem puzzling: this man is the same as that of the literature. There, however, a man who experiences, in his solipsism, the exile produced by the limits of the world. Here, however, the one who sees himself returning to the imperatives of belonging, to the world as a locus of shared existence [3].

We have the conviction that what happens to man is the same as what happens to philosophy. Wittgenstein said, of the philosophers in investigations § 116, "we drive words from their metaphysical employment back into their everyday employment." We can, by extension, affirm that between the literature and that of investigations, man was brought from metaphysical solipsism to the daily life of shared language in the form of life [5].

The man of Investigations is the ceremonial man. The ceremony, in its ritual compass, only recovers meaning and significance in the sharing of its own language of specific play, sustained by the way of life; it is the man of belonging. This man is nothing, nothing can express, nothing can mean, nothing can desire or dream but involved in an activity; in a form of life. It is no longer a question of the man isolated from society, but of the one identified in the community [9].

In the environment of ceremonial man we find that nothing that is human can be thought of or realized outside the space of a life form. But we must be alert because it is not only a question of being in a form of life or of belonging to it, but also and above all that it is, first of all, our own constituent; we are in a form of life and we are the form of life in which we are [10].

Our belonging to the world does not reflect a universal isolation as it seems to happen with the mystical man of the Tractatus. We are, first of all, of a universality that is particularized in the specificity of the languages of our endless games. We are and move in a way of life. But nothing is certain, because there is no order of reasons that can justify belonging to a community of practitioners of a

language. The man of Investigations is the man engaged against the man suspended and isolated from the Tractatus. So says Taylor:

On the surface, however, a work like Philosophical Investigations points in a very different direction. The ultimate term to which the account of meaning leads us is that of *Leben* form. And this seems to offer the perspective of reporting the human way of life capable of overcoming the illusions of detached conception, helping us to see more clearly the distortions that our hegemonic practices and institutions have imposed on us. Wittgenstein's philosophy has been considered the basis of a kind of liberating naturalism. We can see it, in other words, as the foundation of a new humanism [9].

## 7. Final Consideration

This article dealt with the reality contained in human life, through the focus of language in the preface of the Tractatus, a proposition of reflection on the human being, in the narrative of Western philosophy.

From his experiences in the first World War, and then in Vienna with several attempts as a gardener, teacher, architect, Wittgenstein leaves philosophy aside to experience the existence of reality, through the intricacies of identity, will and ethics, to arrive at anthropological contributions about God, happiness and death.

To these experiences, the author of Tractatus, used solipsism to, through the understanding of 'my world and ' my language', perceive the complexity of 'our world' and 'our language'.

Although his withdrawal from philosophy did not, in fact, remove him from the philosophical environment, there was the pretense of solving problems, but that, from his experiences, his understanding reached the stage that problems do not need to be solved and, yes, eliminated, to later realize that this essence did not exist.

Returning to the philosophical context, in the Vienna Circle, and questioned by Frank Ramsey, he turned his thought to the fundamental questions of what he considered solved, starting with anthropological considerations of the meaning of language in its understanding and functioning.

The change of style and language, as well as the detachment when the connections themselves of the writings, from that moment, led to the glimpse of the path from the solipsistic man to the communal man.

From the perspective of dialogue, the author records his considerations with two evident personalities, the theorist with philosopher's ways and the Socratic dialogue, which shows the possible deception in the conception of the ceremonial man and his life, based on the importance and understanding of the rules and their follow-up, contrary to what is proposed in his work.

This relationship between thought and language and the impossibility of private language, the theme of the self and consciousness, the problem of intentional States and their analogy with grammar, realities such as reasons, motives and justifications, the relationship on meaning and understanding of mental states, all these segments related to the human species were resumed from the perspective of phenomenology, as well as expectation, belief and hope with respect to grammar, investigating the fact of wanting to do and what it means to say in everyday life.

In a second moment, the author reflects, from methodology, without scientific pretensions, how he exposes the use of the word 'see'; the experience, the attribution of psychological states in relation to the dream and memory, intentionality.

The work *Philosophical Investigations*, summarizes the three fundamental, already commented and innovative in the context of Western philosophy, with the purpose of presenting a new vision about the events of reality and man.

In his investigations, Wittgenstein points out, in *Tractatus*, that the understanding of language is dependent on the meaning of simple signs and their manifested application, while, in investigations, the use itself, of language, figures in the context of the word or phrase, or how it is used decided by who uses it and should not be used.

Figuratively speaking, the intentionality of the use was made present by body movement, denote through natural language, Easy Expression, gaze, body movements, tone of voice, to express different states of mind.

In investigations, the record of the practice of ordinary language is presented, governed by rules, such as language games, which through a large number of words, tools, which despite not mastering anything at all, have meaning.

This same game contains some characteristics, the first of which is simplicity, the simple fact of the primitive use of language in its exercise.

The expression of activity is the second characteristic implicit in this game, the link between speaking and performing the activity.

As a third characteristic, the author indicates that the fire of language is derived from the strength of the rule, exemplifying that all activities are implicit rules of conduct or grammar.

As a fourth characteristic, there is indeterminacy, which points out that the adjacencies of the games lack clarity.

Plurality, a fifth characteristic, demonstrating that nothing is fixed and that new language games can exist, as well as some that grow old and others that are forgotten.

There is also, the sixth particularity, the presence of terms of comparison, which indicate which means in which action will be performed, given that the games particularize the objects.

Six particularities that determine our understanding for the use of language and its reflection regarding its logical or grammatical relationship, rules that govern each individual, as well as their meaning in the context of the situations where they are employed.

Even with so many particularities, the use of language is a form of human behavior, to relate and interact with others and with the community in which it is inserted at the time of use. Language games determine the experiences of each community and their differences.

The patterns of conduct inherent in each community, are peculiar and are part of an agreement in the forms of life, which is equivalent to saying that the language is shaped by the games and rules of each place, even if there are no similarities to identify, they are unique in themselves.

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