"Unfinished Business" of U.S. Diplomacy & the Cultural Cold War

Nathan M. Moore

Claremont Graduate University ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7275-7323

*Corresponding author: Nathan M. Moore

Claremont Graduate University ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7275-7323

Abstract

American intervention abroad took on varied forms of creative representation during the Cold War. In the period from the 1950s through to the fall of the Soviet Union, a host of new and inventive platforms emerged promoting free expression in things like exhibitions, world fairs, literary works, and radio broadcasting. These are some of the focal points historians have studied in detail. They were wielded by the United States government as a tactic to shape the hearts and minds of international spectators. This historiographical essay addresses the set of arguments that historians have posited explaining how various elements of popular culture were employed as a psychological weapon. Furthermore, this paper argues that examples of psychological warfare in Europe like radio broadcasting and film in Asia created distinct interregional networks where the U.S. proliferated its Americanization agenda through corporate military partnerships. In many ways, historians of the Cultural Cold War make a case for these regional networks being the backbone of intelligence efforts in the U.S. and highlight how consumerism was intertwined with new archetypes of both business culture and military fanaticism. "Cultural Transfer" is a term that Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht defines along a spectrum of meanings, mostly as a way of depicting the diplomatic, cultural transmission of U.S. policy and products. Other historians like Christina Klein and Sangjoon Lee provide specific examples of American consumerism and modernity being deployed in art and technology throughout Asia. This overlap is underemphasized.

Keywords: *Cold War, Cultural Criticism, Cultural History, Diplomatic History, History of Science, Media Studies.*

INTRODUCTION

This process of corporatization counterposed the phenomenon of cultural diplomacy in Europe that Richard Cumming and Andrew Falk show in their depiction of covert radio programs in the Soviet bloc (Cummings, 2009). A debate within the larger Cultural Cold War field has been between the twin concepts of "Americanization" and "Westernization." These two academic disciplines compare diplomatic efforts at making American policies and culture in Europe the norm, versus the holistic creation of a universal transatlantic, westernized community sharing American and European values. It is important to understand this

debate to grasp the global transatlantic community of values that introduced the American lifestyle, cultural habits, and consumptive products into a mainstream influence abroad. Linda Risso's description of radio broadcasting during the Cold War makes a case for viewing it as a primary example of Americanization versus Westernization in action (Risso, 2013, p. 145). Risso (2013) argues that historians have overemphasized individual radio programs over their larger institutional relationship with other propaganda agencies of the West (p. 146). This is important in our examination of interregional networks. But why not just refer to it as the "corporatization" of the modern world and the production of much-needed military assets?

It was widely asserted that the Republic of Korea's strength and wellness fell to the arms race most vehemently, as a neighbor to both North Korea and the Soviet Bloc. Americanization as other historians have documented went dormant as American troops unseized their dominance in the region. The burden of defense and defense spending was tantamount after Richard Nixon in the 1970s reduced the number of United States troops in newly formed South Korea. So, without Americanization or Westernization, the remaining categorical imperative was "Corporatization" in the R.O.K., but at a high cost. It became true that "basic to the economic changes wrought by the Government in the latter part of this period was the growth of a small number of large trading and industrial conglomerates" as documented in "Investigation of Korean American Relations: Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives." Here we find Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, and Ssangyong groups becoming the dominant movement or cultural factor building up arms races for the people of Korea.

As the social strata of European society wrestled with either mimicking the American values or adapting them to their own set of standards, historian Holger Nehring (2004) writes that in the years between the 1940s and 1970s Westernization became a distinct process from Americanization in two ways (pp. 175-191). First, Westernization refers to the entire transatlantic community that bound the U.S. and Western Europe together into a shared value system. Second, the Westernization model is part of a methodology Nehring calls "Cultural Transfer." This is the same idea that has been taken up by him and other scholars like Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht to explain a uniform "consensus liberalism" that has presided over the world of democracy more generally.

On the opposing side of this debate, we find the idea of Americanization taken up by historian V.R. Berghahn to represent a nuanced approach to the Cultural Cold War that is not "superficial," as Nehring implied. Berghahn's refutation claims that "profound underlying forces and ideas" could be applied to other continents for historians to examine how a unique rapport with the United States became an arbiter of distinctly American values that did not exist in a broader transatlantic community (Berghahn, 2010, p. 107). Furthermore, Berghahn contends that the presence of U.S. diplomatic agents in Western Europe resulted in new socio-political and economic institutions that were put up in direct opposition to Americanization rather than intertwined with it. In Berghahn's view, it makes Americanization a theoretical structure that does not relish in creolizations and blendings but rather stands up against alternate European structures. It also suggests that Western Europe's landscape was not the sole arbiter of American diplomacy abroad and that Americanization was

happening in other non-European locations to create niche markets of influence. The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe and especially programs like Radio Free Europe (RFE), Voice of America (VOA), and Radio Liberty (RLT) could pierce the Iron Curtain and further promote the American anti-communist regime to a foreign audience (Risso, 2013, 145).

While global Cold Wars continued to ravage parts of Asia, the Soviet Bloc, Africa, and Latin America, the United States remained interested in selling the idea of peace to foreigners, especially to Japan. "Morris Low's" "chapter" Atoms for Peace in Brussels and Osaka" is a good example of Americanization because it argues that the 1950s confrontation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. entered Asia to gain direct market access for U.S. products (Molella, 2019, p. 53). In 1970 the Expo held in Osaka became the first international fair ever held in Asia. The Japanese had recovered from a devastating loss at the hands of atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and their Japan Pavilion sought to show the world that the Japanese people had put the war behind them and had rebuilt their economy. Both the 1958 Expo in Brussels and the 1970 Expo in Osaka played vital roles in restructuring the Japanese economy with help from the United States. The U.S. State Department and the United States Information Agency (USIA) shared responsibility for the American Pavilion in Expo '58 which was the first major world's fair and international exposition in the postwar era. It was finally approved by the Bureau de International Expositions (BIE) and its theme was "A World View: A New Humanism" (Molella, 2019, p. 48). Despite all the attention the U.S. and Soviet Union received, the unfinished business of civil rights made Congress slash the U.S. exhibit's budget to only $13 million due to the negative image of America's racial fight at home.

The reduced number of U.S. showcases in the International Hall of Science after budget reductions of Expo '58 resulted in an increased Soviet presence in the vacated space, but it also highlighted other roles the U.S. had to play in exploiting its nuclear power in a place where they had already reaped the negative consequences of nuclear warfare. Morris Low's (2019) attention to the visual narrative on display during Expo '58 tells the story in three parts; history, industry, and everyday life, also known as "The Japanese Hand and the Machine" (Molella, p. 49). The rich cultural legacy of Japan's gagaku imperial court music or Nō theater music could be heard in the background. Yet, there were also deftly made images of destruction, though on the other side were images of a new industrialized Japan displaying advanced scientific instruments like electron microscopes, Geiger counters, lenses, and cameras to inspire the Japanese people to make progress as technical advancements following World War II increased. Other visual narratives sparked psychological intrigue as miners foisted next to a big red truck were displayed next to textile handicrafts such as ceramics and basketry that became focal points of U.S. operations in Asia. By 1970, the Expo that arrived in Osaka built on earlier exhibitions and made its theme "Progress and Harmony." It also celebrated Japan's postwar achievement of rapid economic growth by showcasing Japan's first two American-made light-water reactors uniting the U.S. government and private industry pavilions together in impressive representations of science and technology. The domestication of nuclear technology for good as well as the Fujipan Robot Pavilion stand as primary examples that Morris Low uses to explain the business side of U.S. diplomacy during the Cultural Cold War. Expo '70 to Low was a

peaceful proposition that helped to keep Japan a friendly partner to United States enterprises and political interests.

In Jessica Gienow-Hecht's article "Cultural Transfer," the *critique of modernity* comes up as a significant topic that representatives of this group, like Jurgen Habermas, Marshall Berman, and others, used to trigger investigations into cultural imperialism. They portrayed this cultural imperialism as a hindrance to modernity. Ironically, while the big currents of capitalism were being pushed onto non-Western cultures such as Japan, these scholars show that recipients in these countries had their choices conditioned by the values of a capitalist-based "modernity" that benefited a Westernized notion of progress (Gienow-Hecht, 2004, p. 267). Thus, Gienow-Hecht's assertion of Westernization through the critique of modernity reveals the ways non-Western cultures created niche markets for American businesses and cultures. Linda Risso (2013) cites historians like Victoria De Grazia and Walter Hixon, whose theories and analysis on audience responses to imported media like radio propaganda prove that these niche relationships with technology were made also into status circles (p. 31). An example of this is the Rotary Club, a movement idolizing celebrity appeal since the early twentieth century and acquiring business connections. Morris Low's work on the 1970 Expo in Osaka is but one example of cultural transfer in action because he addresses the rapid pace of technological development being a primary motive of U.S. intervention. The idea of modernity deserves closer attention in the historiography of the Cultural Cold War as a vehicle sometimes constructed in opposition to the tenets of family or tradition.

The popular rhetoric of literature during the Cultural Cold War had evolved since World War II to encompass new trends forwarding protest and nuclear literary works. Meanwhile, the field of public relations grew in the decade preceding World War II in the Department of State where the Division of Cultural Relations in 1938 specifically declared that the private sector would be "a major partner in developing policies" (Barnhisel, 2015, p.12). Plutocrat philanthropists such as Nelson Rockefeller helped mediate schisms separating the businesses, art and foundation world, and the government through language. Thus, the cultural and commercial relations that Greg Barnhisel presents in his book *Cold War Modernists* argue that diplomatic undertakings to "Americanize" the rest of the world are part of a broader historical trend emphasizing "soft power" promoting popular figures, especially writers and orators. In *Late Cold War Literature and Culture,* the nuclear 1980s becomes the generational consequence culminating in the few decades following the end of the 1950s. In it, Daniel Cordle (2017) makes the argument that popular culture was never neutral and that it was political, always (p. 47). Cordle's thesis includes the politics of vulnerability and gender, family, and society as part of a narrative that reoriented these into techno-fetishism for the military intelligence machine. *The Hunt for Red October* (1984) is but one example by Tom Clancy of this. In *Cold War Modernists* Barnhisel cites historians Francis J. Colligan with Ninkovich and Arndt to demonstrate how staffing private non-profit agencies since 1958 made early informationalist agencies viable by utilizing public outreach with "the people." They also maximized private agreements. What Nye defined as "soft power" foregrounds our perception of a country's attractiveness and ability to persuade with charismatic propaganda. Maximizing the value of press, publishing, radio, motion pictures, and other agreements depended on figureheads – entertainers, artists, and writers who were valuable assets, Barnhisel writes.

Writers like William Faulkner were excellent cultural ambassadors for the United States because of his ability to wield popular rhetoric. In 1955 they brought him to Japan for three weeks touring cultural sites and speaking at a Nagano seminar for Japanese professors and literature students. Barnhisel shows how Faulkner's arrival in Japan helped defend the idea of democracy as the best system the world had devised. Faulkner's visit also reiterated the plight of Civil Rights issues back home in America, which he saw parallels in with the Japanese in the years following WWII. In 1953, a couple of years before Faulkner visited Japan, Barnhisel highlights how historian Gunnar Myrdal's book *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* was but one work seeking to portray America's racial situation to foreigners. Joe Louis, Jackie Robinson, Booker T. Washington, and George Washington Carver were a few others, but what they shared in common most was being the inspiration for the exhibit called *Unfinished Business* at the 1958 Brussels World's Fair, writes Barnhisel. Both Morris Low's chapter "Atoms for Peace in Brussels and Osaka: World's Fairs and the Shaping of Japanese Attitudes to Nuclear Power" and *Cold War Modernists* by Barnhisel reiterate how the legacy of entertainers, athletes, and other popular figures influenced the Cultural Cold War. Faulkner's reputation as a homemade farmer only heightened attention on the southern U.S.'s culture but by Faulkner's admission, the South and Japan carried startling similarities that persisted both after the Civil War, and at the end of World War II making them peculiar allies of the United States. The ethos of individuality and freedom was not isolated to Faulkner's trip to Japan but in his other excursions to Rome, Brazil, Munich, Paris, London, and Reykjavik he reinforced stereotypes about race relations through what polemical pundits deemed hypocritical stances on racial injustice, and segregation. Yet, the culture of the elite versus the poor revealed stark contrasts in material and social wealth in these localized regions. It was only right that other philanthropic organizations such as non-profits stepped in to help.

Asian cinema was previously overlooked in the historiography of the Cultural Cold War, but its importance has been investigated in more recent scholarship. Christina Klein's work *Cold War Cosmopolitanism: Period Style in 1950s Korean Cinema* and Sangjoon Lee's *Cinema and the Cultural Cold War: US Diplomacy and the Origins of the Asian Cinema Network* speak to the importance of viewing U.S. diplomacy in Asia, not as mere peripheral happenstance, but a central facet of the Cultural Cold War. Lee (2020) takes readers on a historical journey from inception to the demise of The Asia Foundation, formerly the Committee for a Free Asia which was a private non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of California in 1951. From 1953 to the early 1960s, The Asia Foundation operated with the CIA to make "a significant contribution to the development in Asia and of Asian-American understanding and friendship," and is part of Lee's account of this "First Network" stage during the Eisenhower administration. It was non-governmental philanthropic organizations such as The Asia Foundation that spurred an interest in supporting anti-communist film personnel abroad – producers, directors, writers, technicians, critics, and more. Malaysia and Thailand were hotspots contributing to the creation of the Southeast Asian Film Festival. The "free Asia" anti-communist bloc was controlled then by a United States regime bent on driving the Cultural Cold War from within. Meanwhile, the demise of The Asian Foundation at the end of the 1950s needed a boost of regional support to keep the Asian film industry erect. The

"Second Network" was born. In the 1960s, South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, and Taiwan experienced a "Golden Age" of cinema.

The East Asian studio networks did not arrive out of the blue, Lee argues. The leftover interregional links that the 1950s-era filmmakers worked so hard to create led to a Golden Age of filmmaking in South Korea, especially, when new "Asian Studio Networks" picked up where the others left off. Chapter 6 of Lee's book *Cinema and the Cultural Cold War* explores the largest South Korean motion picture studio of the time from 1952 to 1975, Shin Films. It was managed by Shin Shang-ok. Historian Christina Klein (2020), likewise, highlights other prominent South Korean filmmakers during this Cultural Cold War period like Han Hyung-mo (1917-99) who launched the Golden Age of South Korean cinema in his own right. From the mid-1950s to the early 1970s Han explored women's relationships to modernity in South Korea which introduced new genres, characters, technologies, and enterprises into the region. Christina Klein's work in *Cold War Cosmopolitanism* is about style, first and foremost, and about periodizing post-war South Korea within the "forgotten decade" of the 1950s. The Korean War and Cold War, especially, hindered South Korea's engagement with the rest of the world because of restrictions on the unacceptable "other." Yet, as Klein demonstrates the effects of cosmopolitanism countered the divisive forces of the Cold War and also created an independent culture encouraging South Koreans to open up to the noncommunist other and move beyond their national boundaries.

The term Free Asia became a way of endearing Western practices, Hollywood symbolism, and a consumer ethos into the Asian marketplace. Klein and Lee demonstrate how Cold War cosmopolitanism is in many facets synonymous with American consumerism in the 1950s. Klein's chapter "Consumer Culture and the Black Market" espouses the visually dense and lush objects, alluring objects, which are present in the mise-en-scène. *Madame Freedom's* Paris Boutique scene documented the mobile camera technique that began on the sidewalk and ends at the display window, and peers into the glass encasing of Ponds cold cream, a box of Coty face powder, perfume, lipsticks, men's shirts, and a cardigan sweater. These moments of visual pleasure infused a sense of abundance in a time of scarcity for South Korea. Glamour like this invigorated a growing, popular desire to achieve a similar kind of lifestyle. Thus, South Korea's modernization efforts hinged on advertising Han's films, and in Klein's (2020) methodology she cites Arjun Appadurai, whose analytical framework of consumer culture invites scholars to investigate "the social life of things." Consumer artifacts were embedded into networks of trajectories that carried social contexts beyond just national and cultural boundaries. By showing products of American industry, we recognize how Han's films also strengthened partnerships within global Free World economic ideologies.

Japan's proximity to South Korea made them each an example of American consumerism and the network of film culture. Consumerist décor and props were a sign of artistic maturity that was furthered by self-identity in South Korean films' notions of gender and the black market. Many women's roles often became linked to assisting smuggling activity by male counterparts. Within transnational networks of material culture, they would help procure resources from the military base network in the Pacific to supply film studios and maintain the film culture in 1950s South Korea. Klein writes in *Cold War Cosmopolitanism* that the Japanese colonial system's historical relevance was buoyed by developing

the U.S. military base network in the Pacific and also in promoting "budae jjigae," another way to name the equipment poaching of illicit means. The close-knit relationship of South Korean cinema with Japan was a barometer of modernity in the film industry as it was developing in Asia into the 1960s. Additionally, Osaka's 1970 Expo which Morris Low's chapter examined, and Greg Barnhishel's depiction of the 1955 visit to the Nagano seminar for Japanese professors by William Faulkner highlights the rapid change that occurred on the island in the two decades.

Sangjoon Lee's book *Cinema and the Cultural Cold War* provides additional evidence of South Korea's push to acquire sufficient assets that the U.S.'s diplomatic presence created. The Koreans needed to build advanced cinematic techniques the likes of which Japanese cinema had exhibited at the 1962 Asian Film Festival. South Korea's five-year economic development plan that began in 1961 did not exclude filmmaking. In the years between 1960 and 1970, the "Developmental State Studio" gained notoriety as a state apparatus facilitating industrial, trade, and investment strategies in film studios. Shin Films represents the multitude of Shin and Ch'oe family companies run between 1952 and 1975. Some incentives awaited filmmakers from South Korea, like a zero-percent tax on domestic productions in 1954, that was mandated by the Syngman Rhee government. The military coup by the Park Chung Hee government expanded rapid growth sectors and saw the motion picture industry as a strategic industry like textiles and light industries. In 1961, sixty-four film production companies were consolidated into sixteen. Nevertheless, Shin Films found itself in a financial crisis by 1964 when its import business of foreign films shattered under the weight of regulations. Shin Films eventually coproduced big-budget films that shared budget, cast, direction, and contracts with Shaw Brothers. In many ways, U.S. cultural diplomacy abroad was carried on at the behest of foreign markets like those in South Korea demanding visual and artistic exposure.

In *Upstaging the Cold War* Andrew J. Falk (1960) introduces us to the European vantage of this Cultural Cold War. In it, Falk expounds on how the containment of radicals in the United States led to widespread blacklisting. Ironically, the containment of communist "radicals" in the U.S. juxtaposes the Free Asia phenomenon because it highlights an emphasis on defusing Christina Klein's "cosmopolitanism" – which also was supported by the "black market" – in favor of the blacklisted human commodity who emigrated to Mexico or Europe in order become free from the drudgeries of censorship. In this way, Europe became a haven for these individuals to leave the burdened domestic market that faced them with public scrutiny and backlash. These leftist films did not do well in box-office sales. In Europe, as Falk writes, the availability of supportive communities was abroad, as was regular work and artistic freedom. Furthermore, Falk (2020) tells the story of Dalton Trumbo, who was one member of the Hollywood Ten (p. 180). MGM had fought lawsuits for some members of the Hollywood Ten for allegedly breaking labor contracts, and Trumbo claimed to have lost $150,000 in production studio contracts himself. The Cold War environment blacklisted progressives like Trumbo even more and writing scripts for a little advance led to magazine writing to fill the void. Eventually, Trumbo turned to Broadway but was again blacklisted for his left political leanings before getting another opportunity to thrive without public embarrassment, this time in London. Dissident talent then deployed a variety of cultural weapons against "domestic fascism" through other mediums of expression, namely radio broadcasts.

Richard H. Cummings's *Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for Freedom"* and *Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950-1989* provide more context to the wider community of political dissent that arose in Europe. Radio broadcasting in America took off after it became integrated into the U.S. Navy's fleets in World War I. The history of radio technology itself has been examined by historians such as Susan J. Douglas (1989) to chart the trajectory of social and cultural change that accompanied radio's creation in the late nineteenth century. Founding oligarchs like David Sarnoff and RCA in *Inventing American Broadcasting* characterized the business foundations that negotiated private partnerships and made a regulated corporate community. By the 1950s Europe was where political dissent could thrive rather than the already censored public American radio network. However, as Cummings reveals, this had a twofold effect which made Europe popular for expatriates to flee persecution and build a new life, while also promoting U.S. cultural affairs. Thus, Cummings' *Cold War Radio* has many parallels to Falk's *Upstaging the Cold War*.

The European theater of the Cultural Cold War highlights the work of Cummings and Falk for introducing readers to the rise of radio. In *Upstaging the Cold War* Falk argues that when the United States inaugurated radio broadcasts and began exporting motion pictures and books, it was Europe that became the quintessential example of Americanization in the Cultural Cold War. This is because the postwar period is when the U.S. began promoting its democratic capitalist regime throughout the European statutes. The agenda of reeducation and educational reform in English-language classes or American studies curricula was also part of a larger rhetorical war and was something historian Melvyn Leffler called a "preponderance of power" (Falk, 1960, p. 189). The cultural weapon of radio was an instrument aligned with the multitude of languages from which radio could broadcast voices, music, and ideas. Germany and Austria were laboratories to test U.S. hegemony examining whether former enemies would create democratic constitutions, demilitarize, and rebuild their economies, but as with radio, the varying occupied territories became places of interest for state-sanctioned international radio in the postwar years. For example, in 1951 the State Department requested two radio interviews for the show *Arts and Letters* on the Voice of America (VOA) which could provide a mutual understanding between "free world" peoples. These reiterate the ways intelligentsia utilized radio broadcasts within the larger community fighting for freedom in Europe.

Richard H. Cummings demonstrates in his work *Cold War Radio* that the inauguration of radio into Europe became part of covert psychological operations and integral to intelligence action projects. The radio programs Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) can trace their roots back to 1947-48. The genesis of the idea was sparked by the U.S. State Department which had invigorated the idea of American radio broadcasting out of Germany, to the Soviet Union. This plan did not hold with General Lucius Clay who instead persuaded that the U.S. work to sustain the German-language radio station Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) for the Soviet and Berlin-occupied zones of Germany. It should come as little surprise then that the CIA employed a diplomatic strategy that counteracted the detainment and censorship of information in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Thus, Cummings' argument aligns with other historians of the Cultural Cold War who view U.S. diplomacy abroad as a tool for the secret propaganda efforts by American intelligence apparatuses like the CIA. But most notably Cummings attributes the most vital part of this psychological-warfare campaign to the "surrogate" radio stations that broadcast to European nations in many languages. Kenneth Osgood (2000) emphasizes the Dwight Eisenhower administration's appointment of a high-level committee to strengthen the psychological warfare effort in communist Europe (p. 413). Osgood's depiction of the committee, chaired by William H. Jackson, also gave credence to other more radical steps at liberating the communist front, like the balloon-leaflet campaign of the early 1950s.

In *Cold War Radio* Cummings describes the events of "Operation Veto: A Combined Political Warfare Operation" that sought to undermine the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. In April 1954, Radio Free Europe developed a strategic plan that would integrate radio programs into a balloon-leaflet campaign over the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia that would build their morale through refugee statements and reviews of Czech media. It also would mitigate the fiery condemnation of the Soviet Union by making it more costly for the USSR to intervene than to desist, which would only reap more outrage from the populace. In this way, the balloon-leaflet campaign is but one example of the ongoing covert operation by the United States to disrupt the communist regimes not only in Europe, as Cummings shows, but throughout the global arena. As a result of an accident caused by an RFE balloon colliding with a Czechoslovakian plane in 1956 in the Tatra mountains, revenge plots grew in the region. Whether the incident was bad weather or not has been contested, but it triggered profuse bomb threats to RFE buildings and double-agent spies of the Czech Intelligence Service who blended in with German émigré communities. In one case RFE saltshakers were laced with atropine. Josef Frolik, a Czech intelligence officer defected altogether. This and other examples of censorship in radio broadcasts were present in Bulgaria. Cummings uses the example of Georgi Markov whose RFE Bulgarian radio programs regularly focused on the central theme of censorship – such as in the program "Where are You, Dear Censor?" Communist Party Secretary Todor Zhikov received highly classified reports on RFE, VOA, BBC, Deutsche Welle, and Vatican Radio programs. Though as other historians like Andrew Falk have shown, blacklisting was common not only in Europe but also in America's home front where polemical artists reflected a global suppression of the communist "other."

There were other forms of psychological warfare gripping U.S. diplomacy, though much of it remained within America's domestic borders. The persistent coercion that increased the municipal crackdowns on indecent magazines, censorship of rock n' roll music, fights over child custody rights for homosexuals, police surveillance, and prosecution of female abortionists made it clear that social control over gender roles and sexuality were inseparable to psychiatry and the state. *Rethinking Cold War Culture* reiterates the ways America's "domestic containment" of deviant social groups bolstered the national-security state at home and abroad in Jennifer Sherron De Hart's chapter "Containment at Home." White teenagers listening to black rhythm and blues music and the subsequent rise of Elvis signaled that policing sexual boundaries in music and dance was also a way of policing racial boundaries. Oppression, it seemed, crossed more boundaries of a wider margin. The topic of boundaries is prescribed by Simona Tobia in "Europe Americanized?" as a central theme transferring across national boundaries. Tobia (2011) moves away from an analysis of the "Western" propaganda policies, and instead focuses on "de-

centering the Cold War era." This shifts the focus of the Cultural Cold War discussion to the United States' diplomatic efforts and not the 'receivers' of Western Cold War propaganda in Western Europe. As Tobia argues, this approach is comparative but concentrates on Western European countries, namely France, Italy, and Eastern European countries that were targets of American intelligence operations. Tobia, then, situates her thesis in the Americanization camp of the Cultural Cold War debate.

The methodology and organization of Kenneth Osgood's work in *Total Cold War* about Eisenhower's secret propaganda battle further emphasizes the U.S.'s field operations and psych operations as components of a de-centered cultural diplomacy agenda. In many ways, Osgood applies the methodology of Americanization in various contexts to, in effect, "win the hearts and minds" of people. Osgood does privilege some countries over others but states that his focus in writing the book was on Germany, France, Italy, Iceland, Japan, Thailand, Indochina (Vietnam), Philippines, Indonesia, Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil, India, Iran, and Egypt. Osgood selected these due to their geographical diversity and strategic value in the Cultural Cold War. Furthermore, the psychological warfare tactics of the Eisenhower administration were part of a larger trend of disarming the political base of leftist countries by delegitimizing the "cultural offensive" Soviet leaders promoted through a communist form of global diplomacy. It was, as Osgood writes (2008), a "peaceful competition for men's minds." Exchange programs, tours by cultural groups, and international trade fairs became a major form of communication that other historians have addressed candidly, such as Morris Low who contributed his work on Japanese Expos in the book *World Fairs in the Cold War*. These exhibitions allowed the U.S. to "humanize" America as an impersonal government in response to Soviet charges that America was in a way polluted by corporatism and consumerism, something Klein's *Cold War Cosmopolitan*ism attests to.

In the Chapter "Every Man an Ambassador," Osgood writes that the American cultural blitz in the developing nations of the world reflected the Eisenhower administration's belief in a "periphery" of the Cultural Cold War. In many ways, Osgood then positions his work in the camp of Americanization that sought to further impress its products and ideology onto the people of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. As we addressed before, the Asian cinema network was a major hub for disseminating American culture through diplomatic avenues in film. This phenomenon was in-of-itself, de-centered from the West, and instead focused on the building of marketable products to targeted audiences. Yet, the Cultural Cold War had been driving The Asia Foundation from behind the curtain, as well, with backing from the CIA to support Osgood's claim that psychological warfare underpinned most aspects of the Cultural Cold War. In Audra J. Wolfe's work *Freedom's Laboratory* (2020), we meet Bentley Glass, whose life story reflects the tumultuous nature of scientific diplomacy in underserved communities (p. 13). We find that Glass's profession as a geneticist including his relationship with the U.S. government ushered in civil liberties for minorities. Wolfe's work aligns with Osgood when we reach the topic of The Asia Foundation because, unlike the Congress for Cultural Freedom, The Asia Foundation's operations were entirely run by the CIA from the time of its creation in 1954 to when its cover was blown in 1967.

The topic of cultural ambassadors was examined in Greg Barnhisel's work on modernist art and literature in *Cold War Modernists* with the example of William Faulkner, among others. Yet, Osgood shows us that the current of cultural diplomacy rested on the backs of a few private organizations and government-subsidized travel that also usually included at least some private sponsorship. The American National Theater Academy (ANTA) and Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) were organizations that sent U.S. symphonies, operas, plays, dancers, musicians, actors, other artists, and athletes abroad. The OCB emphasized the importance of "distinctive American creations" in their programs. Not unlike Barnhisel's depiction of American cultural icons gaining footing overseas, Osgood substantiates the case for Americanization in the Cultural Cold War is dominated not only by intelligence operations and psychological warfare tactics but also by the individuals and figures they manipulated and promoted in the press and media. Such examples that Osgood provides are jazz musicians Louis Armstrong and Dizzie Gillespie who attracted long lines in sold-out concerts in movie theaters. Other Negro ambassadors were promoted to heavily combat the Soviet depiction of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* predominating black life in America. Duke Ellington, Betty Allen, the Jubilee Singers, and the folk opera *Porgy and Bess* helped reshape the image of broken racial relations in America. It also touted the veracity of the CIA's effective campaigns with the U.S. Information Agency to publicize American democratic values.

The next best historiographical text on the CIA and its involvement with the Cultural Cold War would have to include Frances Stonor Saunders's *The Cultural Cold War*. In it, Saunders argues that America's psychological operation extended its reach into the cultural affairs of its allies and international partners to facilitate the creation of new art. It also brought into question the ethical dilemma of the Cultural Cold War. Saunders's work also compels us to consider how the U.S.'s regular intervention in organic intellectual growth did not produce real freedom but a pseudo-freedom that was fundamentally controlled by forces outside of people's control. This made it hard for art exhibits, for example, to become a successful hit, abroad. The reputation of modernism had been challenged since 1958 in Brussels with the U.S. pavilion called *Unfinished Business*. And, as the history of the period demonstrates, covert coups and assassinations fully backed by the CIA's cronies only exasperated the problems of soil erosion, urban housing, or the segregation that the *Unfinished Business* display promoted (Saunders, 2013). That display would eventually be taken down completely. In Michael L. Krenn's *Fall-Out Shelters for the Human Spirit* (2005) examples of distinctly American forms of art like pastoralism supported the Americanization side of the Cultural Cold War debate. But Krenn also proves that the demise of America's art programs accompanied what Margaret Cogswell described in 1964 as the intrusions of "the bureaucratic structure of government." In 1964, the *Communication Through Art* exhibit in Pakistan was operated by the USIA and was supposed to build communities encouraging the creation of networks for Americans to talk with local art students, museum directors, government officials, and critics. The basic idea of coordinating three separate exhibits arrived in Pakistan (graphics), Turkey (works on paper), and Iran (works by American women), but failed to reach popularity.

The psychosis of art is a microcosm of the global Cultural Cold War that had taken place within American intelligence agencies since the middle of the long twentieth century. And by allocating a Gramscian "Cultural Hegemony" of corporatism abroad (Ruccio, 2006), the tactic of wooing European "intellectuals" with

propaganda, abstract expressionist art, modernity, and the sentimentality of techno-fetishism was vital to U.S. diplomatic efforts abroad. But none I think grapple with the Cultural Cold War more adequately than in the corporatization of industry and social strata known as big business. From Brazil to Ecuador, Israel, Pakistan, Syria, Senegal, Southern Rhodesia, and Taiwan, art exhibits got their chance to shine outside of the familiar European and East Asian posts. Corporatization remains a viable explanation that historians can reference in their discussions on the Cultural Cold War because it is something that fully crossed transnational borders the U.S.'s diplomatic policies were meant to penetrate. It resulted, after all, in domestic policies and conglomerates that partnered with their Western counterparts rather than antagonize them. Radio in the Soviet bloc and Asian film studios sometimes were the villains, while corporations such as Hyundai or Samsung were able to remain staples of interregional networks. They fulfilled the goal of making new exchange partners for American enterprises to thrive.

Reference

1. Barnhisel, Greg. *Cold War Modernists: Art, Literature, and American Cultural Diplomacy*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2015.

2. Berghahn, Volker R. "The Debate on 'Americanization' among Economic and Cultural Historians." *Cold War History* 10, no. 1 (2010): 107–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740903388566.

3. Cordle, Daniel. *Late Cold War Literature and Culture: The Nuclear 1980s*. Nottingham, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

4. Cummings, Richard H. *Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for Freedom": Rallying Americans Behind Cold War Broadcasting, 1950-1960*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2010.

5. Cummings, Richard H. *Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950-1989*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2009.

6. De Grazia, Victoria. *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth Century Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006.

7. De Hart, Jane Sherron. "Containment at Home: Gender, Sexuality, and National Identity in Cold War America." Essay. In *Rethinking Cold War Culture*, edited by Peter J. Kuznick and James Burkhart Gilbert, 133. Washington and London: Smithsonian Books, 2001.

8. Douglas, Susan J. *Inventing American Broadcasting: 1899-1922* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

9. Falk, Andrew J. *Upstaging the Cold War: American Dissent and Cultural Diplomacy, 1940-1960*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011.

10. Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C.E. "Cultural Transfer." *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 2004, 257–78. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511806445.017.

11. Glassman, J., & Choi, Y.-J. (2014). The Chaebol and the US Military—Industrial Complex: Cold War Geopolitical Economy and South Korean Industrialization. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 46*(5), 1160-1180. https://doi.org/10.1068/a130025p

12. "Investigation of Korean American Relations: Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives." University of Florida Digital Collections (George A. Smathers Libraries), October 31, 1978. https://original-ufdc.uflib.ufl.edu/AA00023983/00001/3j.

13. Jeong, Hyeju Janice. "Hyundai, Made in Jubail: Cold Wars, Business Networks and States behind Saudi Mega-City." MEI Insight No. 190, 2018.

14. Klein, Christina. *Cold War Cosmopolitanism: Period Style in 1950s Korean Cinema*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2020.

15. Korean War Armistice | Wilson Center Digital Archive. Accessed August 24, 2024. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/topics/korean-war-armistice.

16. Krenn, Michael L. *Fall-Out Shelters for the Human Spirit: American Art and the Cold War*. Chapel Hill, London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005.

17. Lee, Sangjoon. *Cinema and the Cultural Cold War: US Diplomacy and the Origins of the Asian Cinema Network*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020.

18. Molella, Arthur P., and Scott Gabriel Knowles, eds. *World's Fairs in the Cold War: Science, Technology, and the Culture of Progress*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2019.

19. Nehring, Holger. "'Westernization': A New Paradigm for Interpreting West European History in a Cold War Context." *Cold War History* 4, no. 2 (2004): 175–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740412331391855.

20. Osgood, Kenneth A. "Form before Substance: Eisenhower's Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy." *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 3 (2000): 405–33. https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00225.

21. Osgood, Kenneth Alan. *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2008.

22. Risso, Linda. "Radio Wars: Broadcasting in the Cold War." *Cold War History* 13, no. 2 (2013): 145–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2012.757134.

23. Ruccio, David F. "Unfinished Business: Gramsci's Prison Notebooks." *Rethinking Marxism* 18, no. 01 (January 2006): 1–7. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003421788-2.

24. Saunders, Frances. *The Cultural Cold War: the CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*. New York, London: The New Press, 2013.

25. Tobia, Simona. "Introduction: Europe Americanized? Popular Reception of Western Cold War Propaganda in

Europe." *Cold War History* 11, no. 1 (2011): 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2011.545593.

26. Wolfe, Audra J. *Freedom's Laboratory: The Cold War Struggle for the Soul of Science*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2020.